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THE PALAPA SPACE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
Staying In The Space Communication 
Business In An Uncertain STS World
S. BRATARALIM
P.A. PORTMANN
DIRECTORATE GENERAL
POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
JAKARTA, INDONESIA.
ABSTRACT
Indonesian social development 
has depended greatly upon the PALAPA 
space communication system since 1976 
as one major component in the crea- 
tion of a national infrastructure to 
enhance business development and the 
dissemination of national cultural in- 
formation. The success of the first 
two satellites in serving telephone 
and television and in setving the Ase- 
an region has made it necessary to as- 
sure the continuity of these opera- 
tions through the 1980's and beyond. 
Replacement Bl and B2 satellites have 
been contracted for delivery in early 
1983. The uncertainties of placing 
these two new satellites in their 
chosen geosynchronous orbit locations 
has presented some unique problems of 
management particularly in respect to 
the choice of launch vehicles due to 
launch uncertainties , and the 
assessment of the risk of potential 
launch failure on ongoing 
telecommunication system operations. 
Planning for recovery from the many 
contingencies presented as potential 
catastophies in the path to 
successful replenishment of the 
present space system has necessitated 
consideration of a number of 
strategies involving launch schedule 
for alternate vehicles , launch 
insurance, relaunch costs, as well as 
component production delays and 
launch slot availability for space 
flight operations.The objective of 
these management considerations have 
been to minimize costs to the 
Indonesian government while providing 
a high degree of assurance that the 
required communication capacity of 
the satellite system will be 
maintained in support of the national 
telecommunication system.
INDONESIAN SOCIAL OBJECTIVES
Indonesia is a dynamically grow- 
ing country with a population of over 
130 million inhabitants distributed 
in 50 thousand villages and cities 
throughout a land area of about 1.9 
million square km. This population is 
distributed among 992 inhabited is- 
lands. The social organization of the 
country and its government has evolv- 
ed around a policy of equitable dis- 
tribution of new development benefits 
among the population in order to im- 
prove the standard of living for all. 
National five year development plans 
(REPELITAS) have been the motivating 
force in the creation of a balanced 
infrastructure (roads, power 
distribution and telecommunications) 
in support of agriculture, mining, 
manufacturing and commerce. These 
development plans have as their major 
objective the attainment of the 
"TRILOGY OF DEVELOPMENT": a high rate 
of economic growth, equitable distri- 
bution of growth benefits to all, and 
the creation of social justice and 
stability of the society.
Telecommunications have played a 
major role in the implementation of 
the development policy of the coun- 
try. The national telecommunication 
network consists of terrestrial net- 
works, including local cable, a micro- 
wave system spanning the major island 
population centers, undersea cables 
linking on major islands, and the 
PALAPA satellite communication 
system.
The major development of the na- 
tional telecommunication system began 
with the advent of the first REPELITA 
in April 1969. This included the aqui-
3-1
sition of the Java - Ball microwave 
system and its extension to Sumatra 
island. The second REPELITA laid the 
plans for the further development of 
the microwave system, improvement of 
local services and the preparation of 
plans for introduction of the PALAPA 
system. PALAPA was inaugurated on Au­ 
gust 16, 1976. The introduction of PA­ 
LAPA Al made it possible to provide 
improved telephone and telex services 
among forty earth station locations 
which were integrated into the nation­ 
al telecommunication network. At the 
same time TV distribution was provid­ 
ed and served an increasing number of 
locations which broadcast, locally, 
the transmissions of the Jakarta up­ 
link. The system also provided a live 
demonstration of teleconferencing us­ 
ing as the second TV uplink the main 
traffic station at Banda Aceh. The 
success of PALAPA during REPELITA II 
has permitted the further evolution 
of plans, during the current REPELITA 
III, for the further pursuit of more 
ambitious programs under the TRILOGY 
OF DEVELOPMENT: agriculture, indus­ 
try, employment, population redistri­ 
bution, regional development, improve­ 
ment of health and educational servic­ 
es and upgrading of the environment. 
Telecommunications as part of the con­ 
tinuing development of infrastructure 
has continued to receive a high prior­ 
ity for support from the government.
Within the national telecommuni­ 
cation network PALAPA has played an 
increasingly important role in bring­ 
ing telephone services to many remote 
or isolated communities within the In­ 
donesian archipelago's many islands. 
The system has grown from the initial 
forty earth stations to a projected 
228 operating earth station during 
1982. Almost all of these will pro­ 
vide for TV reception in addition to 
telephone and telex service using 
SCPC with demand or fixed frequency 
assignments for operation with the ex­ 
isting satellite system. The satelli­ 
te system has, in a large measure, 
been found to be a very economical 
means of serving many locations well 
before new terrestrial transmission 
facilities could be introduced in the 
same locations. For this reason Indo­ 
nesia has placed a great deal of reli­ 
ance upon the satellite systems and 
has planned for their replacement 
with the new twenty four channel PALA­
PA B systems which are now being 
built by Hughes for launch in 1983 
and 1984. Some of the management prob­ 
lems, and related technical matters 
which have been encountered in bring­ 
ing these new satellites into the na­ 
tional system are presented in the 
following sections.
TECHNOLOGY - FOR REGIONAL 
COMMUNICATIONS VIA SATELLITE
The PALAPA A-series satellites 
each provide twelve channels with a 
nominal bandwidth of 30 MHz, in a con­ 
ventional 6/4 GHz transmission for/- 
mat. TWTAs provide 5 watts into an an­ 
tenna which covers the ASEAN region 
with a minimum e.i.r.p. of 31 dBW and 
a G/T of - 7 dB/K* Geosynchronous or­ 
bit locations are 77Q E. and 83° 
E. longitude. Transponder availabili­ 
ty was initially projected to be 70 % 
of the TWT complement by the end of 
the seven years projected life of 
each satellite. The solar array was 
designed to provide 300 W of power 
and the battery system sized to be 
able to maintain full capability of 
the twelve TWTA's during eclipse ope­ 
rations.
As a regional satellite system 
PALAPA makes use of smaller earth sta­ 
tion antennas than those usually em­ 
ployed by Intelsat. The control sta­ 
tion and eighteen main traffic sta­ 
tions employ ten meter diameter anten­ 
nas which provide a G/T of 31 dB/K. 
The remaining light traffic stations 
in the initial system also employ ten 
meter antennas but new stations to be 
used for light traffic service employ 
4.5 to 5 m antennas. These new sta­ 
tions will provide a G/T of 22 dB/K. 
All of these smaller stations operate 
with SCPC terminals using 400 TWT am­ 
plifiers, and provide high quality TV 
for local rebroadcast.
The growth of the telephone ser­ 
vice in Indonesia in the nine year pe­ 
riod from 1969 to 1978 has been at an 
average rate of 33 % per year. Simi­ 
larly, telex and subscriber long dis­ 
tance dialing have grown at substan­ 
tially the same rates. Transponder u- 
tilization from initial operation in 
1976 has grown from 7 transponders to 
a total of 13 1/2 in 1982. This re-
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present a growth rate of 12 % per 
year. Transponder availability and u- 
tilization are shown in Figure 1, 
"PROJECTED SYSTEM CAPACITY FOR Al AND 
A2 FOR THE PERIOD 1976 TO 1978". A 
predicted need for 20 transponders 
for the year 1983 is shown, together 
with the 1976 and 1982 actual trans­ 
ponders in use. Since operational 
planning for PALAPA includes mainte­ 
nance of a number of spare channels 
for the Al and A2 satellites, these 
figures showed a need for replenish­ 
ing the system in 1983. This was fur­ 
ther emphasized by the onset of expec­ 
ted system capacity losses shown by 
the shaded areas in Figure 1. Accord­ 
ingly plans for the aquisition of PA­ 
LAPA Bl and B2 were undertaken and a 
contract signed with Hughes on Dec 
20 , 1979. Negotiations for launch sup­ 
port were also concluded with NASA 
for optional STS or Delta Launch serv­ 
ices for the two spacecraft on Dec 9, 
1980.
The introduction of PALAPA Bl 
and B2 into the Indonesian system by 
1983 and 1984, nevertheless, has cre­ 
ated some concern for the continuity 
of operations, during the period for 
satellite construction and the uncer­ 
tainty of launch schedules. In part 
the satellite characteristics were 
chosen as a result of growth predict­ 
ions, and in part by recognition that 
if a failure of the first launch were 
to occur a second launch would be 
needed not only for growth, but for 
operations which would have to ac- 
comodate both Al and A2 traffic, as­ 
suming these satellites come to the 
end of their useful life during the 
years 1983 to 1986. A major concern, 
therefore, was the state of health of 
the Al and A2 satellites, together 
with predictions of their useful life 
times over the period when a new PA­ 
LAPA B could be made operational.
One of the first concerns then 
became: what can be done to provide 
continuity of communication service 
in the event of failures of Al and A2 
before a B satellite becomes opera­ 
tional? Three solutions suggest them­ 
selves :
1. Off-load some satellite traf­ 
fic to the microwave backbone- 
system and retain traffic on 
the satellites that has no o-
ther means of transmission.
2. Improve the utilization of in­ 
dividual transponders by us­ 
ing more efficient ground sys­ 
tems, e.g. TDMA instead of FD- 
M/FM.
3. Delay commissioning new earth 
stations until new transpon­ 
ders become available.
A second concern was the actual 
state of health of the two operation­ 
al satellites. Three major subsystems 
were evaluated to assess their poten­ 
tial contributions to system degrada­ 
tion or loss.
REEVALUATION OF ON ORBIT LIFE 
OF TWTA'S
As of 1 February 1982 The PALAPA 
system has experienced no failures a- 
mong the twenty four TWTA'S in operat­ 
ion. Predictions made by others, how­ 
ever, have indicated that some fail­ 
ures should have been experienced. 
The question raised, therefore, was: 
is PALAPA extremely lucky, or have 
these predictions been made correct­ 
ly? It was decided to reexamine data 
available in the literature which pro­ 
vided time to failure of TWTA [Ref. 
R. Strauss and J.R. Owens: "PAST AND 
PRESENT INTELSAT TWTA LIFE PERFORMAN­ 
CE"; AIAA Conference Record, 1980; pp 
98 - 106]. These data were examined 
assuming that a log normal distribut­ 
ion of failure times could represent 
the observed data. The information a- 
vailable provided the times of fail­ 
ure for 24 TWTA'S from a total of 98 
in orbit. These failed units represen­ 
ted two modes of on-orbit operations: 
continuous and eclipse on/off cycl­ 
ing. The on/off cycling is known to 
induce premature failures of the 
TWT f s. Nevertheless both modes of ope­ 
ration were included in the new analy­ 
sis of the data; the result are shown 
in Figure 2 "EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTION 
OF TWTA FAILURE TIMES DURING ON-ORBIT 
OPERATIONS".
From this new distribution, it 
may be seen that the mean failure 
time (50% loss) is 11.77 years. If 
this distribution is representative 
of PALAPA, it becomes possible to pre­ 
dict a loss of three transponders at 
the end of the nominal seven year 
life span of each spacecraft.
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This published Intelsat data 
would seem to indicate that at least 
10 % of the operating TWTA'S should 
have failed on PALAPA by this time. 
The fact that no failures have been 
experienced tends to indicate that 
the data used are conservative, in 
that when eclipse cycled data are re­ 
moved from consideration, better life­ 
times than those now predicted would 
be projected. Based on these conserva­ 
tive data, projections have been made 
for PALAPA TWTA lifetimes, and are 
shown in Table 1 "PROJECTIONS OF TWTA 
LOSSES FOR ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS".
REEVALUATION OF ON-BOARD 
FUEL RESERVES
On board reserves have been moni­ 
tored continuously throughout the ope­ 
rations of PALAPA Al and A2. Starting 
whith 115.91 Ibs of fuel, Sept 1976 
and 117.20 Ibs, July 1977, with con­ 
sumption rates of 12.31 and 11.26 
lbs/yr., respectively, it is estimat­ 
ed that fuel exhaustion will occur in 
February 1986 and December 1987.
POWER SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE
Solar array output has been moni­ 
tored by measuring the output voltage 
under standard load current condi­ 
tions needed to operate the twelve 
TWTA's and the other spacecraft sub­ 
systems. Degradation observed thus 
far in the in-orbit life of the space­ 
craft indicates that this subsystem 
could operate successfully for over 
ten years.
An examination of the battery 
subsystem in 1980 tests, similarly, 
has shown that the depth of discharge 
observed during a 1.15 hour eclipse 
period resulted in a depth of dischar­ 
ge of 59.8% and 56.5% in comparison 
to a 61.5% nominal design value DOD. 
Based on these values battery capaci­ 
ty appears to be adequate to meet 
full operational needs, but at this 
time there is insufficient data to 
make a reasonable prediction for bat­ 
tery degradation or life. Neverthe­ 
less, the battery subsystem is not ex­ 
pected to be a limiting factor in the 
system life.
The nominal seven year life span
of the Al and A2 satellites will be 
attained in July 1983 and March 1984. 
Present rates of degradation for the 
three key subsystems indicate that 
they will continue to operate well be­ 
yond the nominal life periods guaran­ 
teed by the space segment manufactur­ 
er. The status of these subsystems is 
summarized in Table 2, "PROJECTED 
SUBSYSTEM LIFE TIMES OF PALAPA Al AND 
A2".
The introduction of the two PALA­ 
PA B satellites, with current launch 
dates of April 1983 and Jan 1984 will 
add to the existing Indonesian system 
capacity as shown in Figure 3. The 
two satellites, it may be seen, pro­ 
vide for the growth of the system, 
and for the replacement of the Al and 
A2 satellites. With this plan, it was 
next necessary to arrange for the pla­ 
cement of the new satellite into 
their orbital slots. This posed a 
problem of launch vehicles selection, 
while at the same time providing some 
potential for cost savings, but intro­ 
ducing a great deal of uncertainty in 
mission success and launch schedul­ 
ing.
UNCERTAINTY AND CONTINGENCY
The choice of launch vehicles in 
1979 were Ariane, Delta and STS. Each 
of these have their advantages and 
disadvantages. Delta was a proven ve­ 
hicle, but expensive. Ariane was un­ 
proved, but could be less expensive, 
if and when it became operational. 
STS was attractive in terms of price 
but was also unproved and subject to 
uncertainty of available launch date. 
This initial problem was resolved by 
selecting NASA as the launch agency 
and reserving both Delta and STS 
launches. This however required prog­ 
ress payments for two distinct launch 
programs. The choice of Delta was 
made to assure a launch at the selec­ 
ted launch date, while STS, it was 
hoped, would become available in time 
to meet the system operational dates 
required. This dual purchase of 
launch vehicles was continued until 
June 1981, when NASA was advised that 
PALAPA would be launched by STS since 
suitable space in the STS manifest 
was made available for PALAPA Bl and 
B2 satellites by NASA. With these 
plans firmly established the follow-
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ing remained to be resolved:
The possibility of launch failure 
The need for suitable insurance 
The possible need for a backup sa­ 
tellite and Launch Vehicle.
The possibiltiy of launch fail­ 
ure led to an examination of the im­ 
pact of on-orbit transponder availabi­ 
lity. A scenario was developed to pro­ 
vide a guide in analyzing the effects 
of launch failures and provide the in­ 
formation needed to meet any contin­ 
gency in the program. It was recogniz­ 
ed that the probability of a launch 
failure was small , and that the loss 
of both Bl and B2 was not very like­ 
ly. The launch failure models used 
therefore were:
PALAPA Bl fails and B2 suc­ 
ceeds
PALAPA Bl succeeds and and PA­ 
LAPA B2 fails.
Naturally, with Bl and B2 suc­ 
cesses there would be no need to con­ 
sider a back up satellite or launch 
vehicle.
The impact on transponder availa­ 
bility of these two launch failure 
modes is shown in Figure 4 and Figure 
5.
From the launch failure models 
it may be seen that r to cover a poten­ 
tial loss of system capacity, it 
would be necessary to plan a launch 
during the period May 1983 to January 
1984. A Delta launch in June 1983 
would be available if ordered before 
January 15, 1982. This launch,- if not 
needed, would still be available for 
backup of B2, in the event of a loss 
of Bl. None of the available STS mani­ 
fest slots are available during the 
period May 1983, Jan 1984. This situa­ 
tion however, may improve over the 
next year. For the purpose of plann­ 
ing back-up launches the following 
constraints need to be taken into con­ 
sideration, assuming that the best a- 
vailable choice will be made using ei­ 
ther DELTA or STS launch opportuni­ 
ties:
A. DELTA CONSTRAINTS;
A short term start up for a 
Delta launch was available 
prior to 15 January 1982. 
The Delta would have been a-
vailable either for Bl or B2 
operations. Thus launches in 
either March 1983 or June 
1983 could be selected. This 
option was not accepted. Del­ 
ta procurement normally re­ 
quires 30 months for delive­ 
ry.
B. STS Constraints:
Opportunities which appear to 
be available from the present 
STS manifest are as follows:
1. July 1984, flight 17/99
2. July 1984, flight 18/103
3. Febr. 1986, flight 40/99
4. Dec. 1986, flight 52/99.
These uncertainties of launch o- 
perations have an impact on the cost 
of the system operation by a need 
for:
Insurance on the assetts at 
risk and third party liabili­ 
ty.
- The construction of a satel­ 
lite and launch vehicles and 
securing launch services to 
meet contingencies.
Indonesia has elected to cover 
this entire range of uncertainties 
through a single insurance policy. 
This document provides not only for 
the loss of the equipment but also 
covers the costs for relaunch of fail­ 
ed missions.
Preparing the insurance policy 
to cover the entire range of risks, 
has , in itself, been a problem of no 
small magnitude. The issue to be 
dealt with is the uncertainty of a 
launch opportunity for a failed mis­ 
sion.
The uncertainties of space opera­ 
tions and of possible relaunch costs 
lead to the question of how this may 
be covered by appropriate insurance. 
To solve this problem, Indonesia has 
planned to include in its insurance 
policy the possibility of a relaunch 
by Delta if a suitably timed STS re­ 
launch was not available.
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This need is based on the assumption 
in the case of a non-NASA related 
failure, that:
a suitable STS reflight 
could not be guaranteed, due 
to a crowded manifest 
a suitably timed Delta 
launch would be feasible.
In view of the difficulties in 
obtaining a replacement satellite for 
a suitably timed launch, it may be ne­ 
cessary to consider ordering these e- 
quipments and services prior to the 
actual loss.
This would mean additional cost even 
though the impact of such cost is not 
as serious as the loss of services in 
the event that it is not possible to 
get a replacement satellite in place 
before the loss of capacity of the ex­ 
isting system. These decisions are al­ 
so complicated by the crowded launch 
schedules which limit the user's abi- 
lity to make plans which are more res­ 
ponsive to his system needs. This si­ 
tuation is acute for contingency ope­ 
ration and merit the attention of 
users who have to keep their space 
systems in operation and of NASA as 
the supplier of launch services.
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